Abstract. This paper introduces a new adaptive chosen ciphertext attack against certain protocols based on RSA. We show that an RSA private-key operation can be performed if the attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext, returns only one bit telling whether the ciphertext corresponds to some unknown block of data encrypted using PKCS ~1. An example of a protocol susceptible to our attack is SSL V.3.0.
Overview
In this paper, we analyze the following situation. Let n, e be an RSA public key, and let d be the corresponding secret key. Assume that an attacker has access to an oracle that, for any chosen ciphertext c, indicates whether the corresponding plaintext c ~ rood n has the correct format according to the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1.
We show how to use this oracle to decrypt or sign a message. The attacker carefully prepares ciphertexts that are sent to the oracle. Combining the returns from the oracle, the attacker gradually gains information on c d. The chosen ciphertexts are based on previous outcomes of the oracle. Thus, this technique is an example of an adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. Usually, a chosen ciphertext attack is based on the theoretical assumption that the attacker has access to a decryption device that returns the complete decryption for a chosen ciphertext. Hence, if a public-key cryptosystem is susceptible to a chosen-ciphertext attack, that often is considered to be only a theoretical weakness. However, the attack shown in this paper is practical, because it is easy to get the necessary information corresponding to the oracle reply. The attack can be carried out if, for example, the attacker has access to a server that accepts encrypted messages and returns an error message depending on whether the decrypted message is PKCS conforming. This paper is organized as follows. We describe the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1 in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe and analyze our chosenciphertext attack. Different situations in which this attack can be carried out are listed in Section 4. We then analyze the vulnerability of SSL to our attack in Section 5. In Section 6, we report experiments with the technique. In Section 7, we conclude by offering recommendations.
PKCS ~1
In this section, we describe briefly the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1; refer to [11] for details. Currently, there are three block formats: Block types 0 and 1 are reserved for digital signatures, and block type 2 is used for encryption. We describe only block type 2, because it is relevant for this paper. Let n, e be an RSA public key, and let p, q, d be the corresponding secret key (i.e, n = pq and d ~ e -1 (rood ~(n))). Moreover, let k be the byte length of n. Hence, we have 2 s(k-1) < n < 28k. A data block D, consisting of IDI bytes, is encrypted as follows. First, a padding string PS, consisting of k-3-IDI nonzero bytes, is generated pseudo-randomly. Here, IDt must not exceed k -11; in other words, the byte length of PS is a least 8. Now, the encryption block EB = O0110211PSIIOOIID is formed (Figure 1) , is converted into an integer x, and is encrypted with RSA, giving the ciphertext c -x e (mod n). The representation of the ciphertext is not important for this paper.
We are, however, interested in how the receiver parses a ciphertext. First, he gets an integer x ~ by decrypting the ciphertext with his private key. Then, he converts x ~ into an encryption block EB ~. Now he looks for the first zero byte, which indicates the ending of the padding string PS and the start of the data block D. The following definition specifies when this parsing process is successful. Definition 1. An encryption block EB consisting of k bytes -that is, EB --EBIII...IIEBk is called PKCS conforming -if it satisfies the requirements of block type 2 in PKCS #1. In particular, EB must satisfy the following conditions:
00.
-EB2 = 02. -EBs through EBlo are nonzero.
-At least one of the bytes EBn through EBk is 00.
We also call a ciphertext c PKCS conforming if its decryption is PKCS conforming.
Note that the definition of con/orming does not include possible integrity checks. We show in Section 3 that it should not be possible for an attacker to decide whether a chosen ciphertext is PKCS conforming. It is sometimes possible for an attacker to do so even if the data block contains further integrity checks.
3
Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks
In a chosen-ciphertext attack, the attacker selects the ciphertext, sends it to the victim, and is given in return the corresponding plaintext or some part thereof. A chosen-plaintext attack is called adaptive if the attacker can chose the ciphertexts depending on previous outcomes of the attack. It is well known that plain RSA is susceptible to a chosen-ciphertext attack [5] . An attacker who wishes to find the decryption m ~ c d (mod n) of a ciphertext c can chose a random integer s and ask for the decryption of the innocent-looking message c ~ --sec mod n. From the answer m ~ -(c~) d, it is easy to recover the original message, because m --m~s -1 (rood n).
Another well-known result is that the least significant bit of RSA encryption is as secure as the whole message [8] (see also [1] ). In particular, there exists an algorithm that can decrypt a ciphertext if there exists another algorithm that can predict the least significant bit of a message given only the corresponding ciphertext and the public key. H~stad and N~slund recently extended this result to show that all individual RSA bits are secure [9] .
Hence, it is not necessary for an attacker to learn the complete decrypted message in a chosen-ciphertext attack: Single bits per chosen ciphertext may be sufficient.
The result reported in this paper is similar. We assume that the attacker has access to an oracle that, for every ciphertext, returns whether the corresponding plaintext is PKCS conforming. We show that we can use this oracle to compute c d (mod n) for any chosen integer c. Theoretically, we can use H~st~l's and N~lund's algorithm [9] to find c. In this paper, we describe a different algorithm that has as its goal to minimize the number of chosen ciphertexts; thus, we show the practicality of the attack. That is, we are not trying to generalize the attack; rather, we would like to take advantage of specific properties of PKCS #1. In particular, the algorithm relies on the facts that the first two bytes of the PKCS #1 format axe constant, and that we know these two bytes with certainty when a ciphertext is accepted. Also, we use heuristic arguments in our the analysis of the algorithm to approximate the number of expected chosen ciphertexts, rather than finding an upper bound.
Description of the Attack
First, we give a short overview over the attack; then, we describe the attack in detail.
Assume that the attacker wants to find m -= c a (rood n), where c is an arbitrary integer. Basically, the attacker chooses integers s, computes e I-cs e (modn), and sends c ~ to the oracle. If the oracle says that c ~ is PKCS conforming, then the attacker knows that the first two bytes of ms are 00 and 02. For convenience, let
Recall that k is the length of n in bytes. Hence, that ms is PKCS conforming implies that 2B < ms mod n < 3B.
By collecting several such pieces of information, we can eventually derive m. Typically, 220 chosen ciphertexts will be sufficient, but this number varies widely depending on numerous implementation details.
The attack can be divided into three phases. In the first phase, the message is blinded, giving a ciphertext co that corresponds to an unknown message too. In the second phase, the attacker tries to find small values si for which the ciphertext co(si) e mod n is PKCS conforming. For each successful value for si, the attacker computes, using previous knowledge about m0, a set of intervals that must contain m0. We elaborate this process later. The third phase starts when only one interval remains. Then, the attacker has sufficient information about m0 to choose st such that c0(si) e mod n is much more likely to be PKCS conforming than is a randomly chosen message. The size of st is increased gradually, narrowing the possible range of mo until only one possible value remains. Now we describe this attack in detail. The variable Ms will always be a set of (closed) intervals that is computed after a successful si has been found, such that m0 is contained in one of the intervals of Ms.
Step 1: Blinding. Given an integer c, choose different random integers so; then check, by accessing the oracle, whether C(So) e mod n is PKCS conforming. For the first successful value So, set
Step 2: Searching for PKCS conforming messages.
Step 2.a" Starting the search. If i = 1, then search for the smallest positive integer sl > n/(3B), such that the ciphertext co(sx) e rood n is PKCS conforming.
Step 2.b: Searching with more than one interval left. Otherwise, if i > 1 and the number of intervals in Mi-1 is at least 2, then search for the smallest integer st > si-1, such that the ciphertext co(si) e rood n is PKCS conforming.
Step 
b -a until the ciphertext co(si) e mod n is PKCS conforming.
Step 3: Narrowing the set of solutions. After si has been found, the set Mi is computed as Remarks.
Step 1 can be skipped if c is already PKCS conforming (i.e., when c is an encrypted message). In that case, we set So +-1. However, step 1 is always necessary for computing a signature, even if we do not wish to get a blind signature. In
Step 2.a, we start with sl = rn/(3B)], because, for smaller values rnosl is never PKCS conforming.
We use condition (1) because we want to divide the remaining interval in each iteration roughly in half.
We can often improve the attack by using more information. For example, we have not used the fact that any PKCS-conforming message mosi contains at least one zero byte. Moreover, if the attack is performed in a client-server environment, where both parties use the message mosi to generate session keys, we might be able to find this message by exhaustive search if we already knew a sufficient portion of it.
Analysis of the Attack
We now analyze the correctness of the attack and approximate the complexity of, and, in particular, the number of oracle accesses necessary for, this attack. We must make a few heuristic assumptions; hence, we cannot give a rigorous proof of our result.
First, we approximate the probability Pr(P) that a randomly chosen integer 0 < m < n is PKCS conforming. Let Pr(A) = -~ be the probability that, for a randomly chosen integer, the first two bytes are 00 and 02, respectively. Since we have 216B > n > 2SB, it follows that 2 -t6 < Pr(A) < 2 -8.
The RSA modulus is usually chosen to be a multiple of 8; hence, Pr(A) will usually be close to 2 -16. The probability that the padding block PS contains at least 8 non-zero bytes followed by a zero byte is
Assuming a modulus n of at least 512 bit (i.e. k > 64), we have 0.18 < Pr(PIA ) < 0.97; hence, we have 0.18.2 -16 < Pr(P) < 0.97.2 -8.
Next, we explain why our algorithm finds m0 and thus m. We prove that mo E Mi for all i by induction over i. Since m0 is PKCS conforming, we have 2B < mo <_ 3B -1, and so, trivially, mo E Mo. Hence, it follows from the definition of Mi that m0 is contained in one of the intervals. Now we analyze the complexity of the attack. The messages in step 1 are chosen randomly; therefore, this step needs about 1/Pr(P) accesses to the oracle on average to find So. We assume again that, on average, we need 1/Pr(P) accesses to the oracle to find si for i > 1 in step 2.a and 2.b. (See also the remark at the end of this section.)
Let wi be the number of intervals in Mi. Using heuristic arguments, we can expect that w~ will satisfy the following equation for i >_ 1. Therefore, we can expect to find a pair ri, si that satisfies (2) for about each third value of ri that is tried. Thus, it seems easy to find such pairs r~, sl that satisfy (1) and (2) just by iterating through possible values for ri. The probability that si E r2B+r~n 3B-l+r~n] is roughly 1/2. Thus, we will t mo ' mo J find a PKCS-conforming si after trying about 2/Pr(PIA ) chosen ciphertexts.
Since the remaining interval in M~ is divided in half in each step 2.c, we expect to find rno with about 3/Pr(P) +16k/Pr(PIA ) chosen ciphertexts, where k denotes the size of the modulus in bytes. For Pr(P) = 0.18.2 -t6 and k --128 (which corresponds to a 1024-bit modulus), we expect that the attack needs roughly 220 chosen ciphertexts to succeed. The bit length of the modulus is usually a multiple of 8; hence, Pr(P) is close to 0.18.2 -16, as assumed previously.
Remarks. The probabilities in this section were computed under the assumption that the values si are independent of each other. We made that assumption to allow a heuristic analysis of the algorithm. However, the assumption may be wrong in special cases. For example, let us assume that mo and simo are both PKCS conforming with padding strings of similar length; that is, we have, for some integer j, mo = 2 9 2 s(k-2) + 2Sips + D simo = 2 9 2 s(k-2) + 2Sips ~ + D ~.
Then, (2si -1)m0 is PKCS conforming with high probability, since (2si -1)m0 = 2.2 s(k-2) + 2sJ(2PS ' -PS) + 2D' -D often is PKCS conforming too. We believe that such relations generally help the attacker, but it in certain situations the attack might require many more chosen ciphertexts than our analysis indicates.
Usually, the bit size of the RSA modulus is a multiple of 8. This choice is a good one, because, for such a modulus, Pr(P) is small. A modulus with a bit length 8k -7 would make the attack much easier, because, in that case, only about 213 chosen messages would be necessary.
4
Access to an Oracle
In this section, we describe three situations in which an attacker could get access to an oracle.
Plain Encryption
Let us assume that a cryptographic protocol starts as follows. Alice generates a message m (e.g., a randomly chosen key). She encrypts it with PKCS #1, without applying any further integrity checks, and sends the ciphertext to Bob. Bob decrypts the message. If the format of the message is not PKCS conforming, then he returns an error; otherwise, he proceeds according to the protocol. If Eve impersonates Alice, she can easily send messages to Bob and check them for conformance. Note that Eve's attack works even when the protocol includes strong authentication at a later step, since Eve has obtained useful information before she has to respond with an authenticated message.
Note that the RSA encryption standard PKCS #1 [11, page 8, note 3] recommends that a message digest be included before an RSA operation, but for only the signing procedure. Even though the standard mentions that an encrypted message does not ensure integrity by itself, the standard does not indicate where such an integrity check should be included.
Detailed Error Messages
Thus far, we have shown that a reliable integrity check is an important part of an RSA encryption. One way to include such a check is to let the sender sign the message with his private key, before he encrypts it with the receiver's public key. Then, an attacker can no longer hope to create a correct message by accident. Her attack will nonetheless be successful when, in the case of a failed verification, the receiver returns an error message that gives detailed information about where the verification failed. In particular, it would compromise security to return different error messages for a message that is not PKCS conforming and for a message where only the signature verification failed.
A Timing Attack
Certain applications combine encryption and signatures. In such cases, a reliable integrity check often is part of the signature, but is not included in the encryption. Let us assume that an encrypted message c is decrypted and verified as shown in the following pseudo-code: An attacker will not be able to generate a chosen ciphertext c such that this message has a correct signature. However, she will be able to generate messages such that c sometimes passes the check in step 2 and is rejected only after the signature is checked. Hence, by measuring the server's response time, an attacker could determine whether c is PKCS conforming. This timing attack is much easier to perform than is Kocher's timing attack [10] , which measures the time difference of single modular multiplications -a small fraction of the time used for one exponentiation. In our case, however, we have to distinguish between performing only an decryption and performing both an decryption and a signature verification. In the worst case, the time for the signature verification could be significantly longer than the time for the decryption -when, for example, we have a 512-bit encryption key because of export restrictions, but we use a 2048-bit key to ensure strong authentication. In addition, the attacker can chose what signing key is sent to the server. The situation discussed in this paper arises in SSL V.3.0 [7] during the handshake protocol. In particular, the client and server first exchange the messages client, hello and server .hello, which, among other information exchanges, select the cryptographic routines. After that, the client and server may send their public keys and certificates. The client then generates a random secret bit string called pre_master_secret, encrypts that secret bit string with RSA (if that mode was chosen earlier), and sends the resulting ciphertext to the server. The server decrypts the ciphertext. If the plaintext is not PKCS conforming, the server sends an alert message to the client and closes the connection; otherwise, the server continues the handshake protocol. Finally, the client has to send a finished message, which contains strong authentication. In particular, the client has to know the pre_master_secret to compute that message.
Because an attacker must generate a finished message that depends on the pre_master_secret, she cannot complete the handshake protocol successfully. However, she does not have to complete it; she gets the necessary informationnamely, whether her chosen message is PKCS conforming -before the protocol is finished.
There are details of SSL V.3.0 that might hinder this attack if they are implemented the right way. Figure 2 shows the format of the message containing the pre_master_secret before the latter is encrypted with RSA. It contains the version number of the protocol, the purpose of which is to detect versionrollback attacks, in which an attacker tries to modify the hello messages such that both client and server use the compatibility mode and hence use the Version 2.0, instead of Version 3.0, protocols. One implementation that we analyzed [12] checks the version number only if the server is running in the compatibility mode, because otherwise obviously no rollback attack has occurred.
A much more secure implementation would check the version number in all modes, and, if it identified a mismatch, would send back to the client the same error alert as it sends in the case of a decryption error. The result would be that a randomly generated message would be accepted with a probability of about 2-a~ although such a protocol still could not be called secure, the attack shown in this paper would at least be impractical.
The SSL documentation does not specify clearly the error conditions and corresponding alerts. As a result, different implementations of SSL do not react consistently with one another in error situations.
Experimental Results
We implemented the algorithm described in Section 3 and verified experimentally that this algorithm can decrypt a PKCS #1 encrypted message given access to an oracle that, for any ciphertext, indicates whether the the corresponding plaintext is PKCS conforming. We tested the algorithm with different 512-bit and 1024-bit keys. The algorithm needed between 300 thousand and 2 million chosen ciphertexts to find the message. We implemented our own version of the oracle, rather than using an existing software product.
Finney checked three different SSL servers [6] to find out how carefully the servers analyze the message format and what error alerts are returned. One of the servers verified only the PKCS format. The second server checked the PKCS format, message length, and version number, but returned different message alerts, thus still allowing our attack. Only the third server checked all aspects correctly and did not leak information by sending different alerts. 
Conclusion
We have shown a chosen-ciphertext attack that can be carried out when only partial information about the corresponding message is leaked. We conclude not only that it is important to include a strong integrity check into an RSA encryption, but also that this integrity check must be performed in the correct step of the protocol -preferably immediately after decryption. The phase between decryption and integrity check is critical, because even sending out error messages can present a security risk. We also believe that we have provided a strong argument to use plaintext-aware encryption schemes, such as the one described by Bellare and Rogaway [3] . Note that plaintext awareness implies security against chosen-ciphertext attacks [2, 3] . In particular, Version 2 of PKCS #1, which makes use of [3] , is not susceptible to the attack described in this paper.
It is a good idea to have a receiver check the integrity of a message immediately after decrypting that message. Even better is to check integrity before decrypting a message, as Cramer and Shoup show is possible [4] .
